YOUTH PARTY V INEC: CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING ERRORS, AND THE PROSPECTIVE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL.

Publication Details

Publication Date

10/07/2026

Volume / Issue

Vol 1, Issue 2 (2026)

Article No.

051

Journal

British Journal of Contemporary Research

Received

05 Jun 2026

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4

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1

Abstract

The decision of the Federal High Court in Youth Party v Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has emerged as one of the most significant judicial pronouncements on electoral administration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The judgment invalidated aspects of INEC's electoral timetable on the ground that the Commission lacked authority to abridge timelines prescribed under the Electoral Act 2026. While the decision reinforces the principles of legality and statutory compliance, it simultaneously raises profound constitutional questions concerning the relationship between legislative regulation and constitutional powers vested in an independent electoral management body. The controversy has generated renewed debate regarding constitutional supremacy, the limits of legislative control over constitutional institutions, and the role of judicial interpretation in electoral governance. This article critically examines the judgment through the combined lenses of legislative drafting theory, constitutional supremacy, and Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, particularly the concept of the Grundnorm and the hierarchy of norms. Employing a doctrinal research methodology, the study analyses relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the Electoral Act 2026, judicial authorities, and comparative constitutional jurisprudence from South Africa, India, Ghana, and Kenya. Particular attention is devoted to the drafting ambiguities inherent in the Electoral Act, especially the use of time-related expressions such as “not later than,” and the absence of provisions clearly defining the scope of INEC's administrative authority. The study finds that the dispute was substantially occasioned by legislative drafting deficiencies that failed to distinguish between statutory deadlines and operational electoral schedules. It further argues that although the Federal High Court correctly applied the doctrine of ultra vires and emphasised legislative authority, its predominantly literal interpretation insufficiently considered purposive constitutional interpretation, the constitutional status of INEC, and the practical realities of election administration. Drawing on Kelsen's hierarchy of norms, the article contends that ordinary legislation cannot be interpreted in a manner that substantially impairs powers expressly conferred by the Constitution. The article concludes that the Court of Appeal is likely to adopt a harmonisation approach that preserves statutory timelines while recognising INEC's constitutional discretion to issue reasonable administrative schedules necessary for effective electoral management. It recommends legislative reforms to clarify electoral timelines, strengthen constitutional compatibility in legislative drafting, and promote a coherent jurisprudence capable of balancing constitutional autonomy with democratic accountability.

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