ISSN 2979-8582 · Article No. 025
Adedeji Taiwo Adekunle: Department of Industrial and Labour Relations/ General Studies Department, Federal College of Fisheries and Marine Technology, Lagos, Nigeria
Matanmi Kareem A: Department of Industrial and Labour Relations/ General Studies Department, Federal College of Fisheries and Marine Technology, Lagos, Nigeria
Oyero Saheed A: Department of Industrial and Labour Relations/ General Studies Department, Federal College of Fisheries and Marine Technology, Lagos, Nigeria
Sheu Abdul Raheem: Department of Industrial and Labour Relations/ General Studies Department, Federal College of Fisheries and Marine Technology, Lagos, Nigeria
Awoniyi O M: General Studies Federal College of Fisheries and Marine Technology, Lagos, Nigeria
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic restored elections, courts, legislatures, political parties and constitutional rights, but it did not fully transform the security institutions inherited from colonial policing and military rule. This article examines how agencies created to protect citizens have often become tools for controlling protests, intimidating voters, monitoring opposition groups and protecting political elites. It introduces the idea of coercive democratic governance, which describes a democratic system where formal institutions exist, but security practices reduce civic freedom and weaken public participation. Using historical-institutional analysis, documentary evidence and selected cases on protest policing, election security, opposition control and inter-agency overlap, the article argues that repression in Nigeria is not only occasional misconduct. It is sustained by centralized command, political appointments, security narratives, weak oversight, unclear funding and limited punishment for abuse. The study also recognizes that Nigeria faces serious threats such as terrorism, kidnapping, separatist violence, communal conflict and election disorder. Therefore, the issue is not whether Nigeria needs strong security agencies, but whether they serve citizens or rulers. The article concludes that democratic consolidation requires transparent security funding, independent oversight, rights-based protest policing, accountable election security and clear sanctions against abuse. It calls for reforms rooted in legality and public trust.
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This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License . Free to read, share, and adapt with attribution.
British Journal of Contemporary Research
Open Access · Peer Reviewed · Published by Bexford Publishing Ltd
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