Delimitation, the periodic redrawing of electoral boundaries and reallocation of legislative seats among States, does far more than update arithmetic after each census; it decides how much weight each State carries within Parliament. In 2026, the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill and its companion Delimitation Bill sought to redistribute Lok Sabha seats largely on the basis of the 2011 Census, expanding the House from 550 to about 830 seats. Both measures were defeated, but not before triggering nationwide protest and exposing a conflict between two constitutional commitments: the democratic principle that every citizen's vote should carry equal weight, and the federal principle that every State retains an equal claim to dignity within the Union. This paper examines that conflict across four sections: the empirical scale of the asymmetric redistribution the failed formula would have produced, whether the Rajya Sabha still functions as a federal counterweight or merely mirrors the Lok Sabha, the political risk once seat allocation gives way to actual boundary-drawing, and whether Indian law is equipped to detect and correct an abuse of that power before it takes lasting effect. Together, these sections point to a single underlying flaw: the formula embedded in Articles 81 and 82 treats numerical equality among citizens as the only legitimate basis for parliamentary power, leaving federalism no comparable constitutional weight of its own. The paper further examines that degressive proportionality, a genuinely elected Rajya Sabha, open scrutiny of draft boundaries, and separate accountable commissions offer a workable, internationally tested corrective. Keywords: Delimitation; Federalism; Degressive Proportionality; Rajya Sabha; Gerrymandering