China's rise as Africa's largest bilateral creditor has fuelled a persistent debate over whether its lending constitutes "debt-trap diplomacy" or genuine development partnership. This article moves beyond that binary by comparing two major, long-standing recipients of Chinese finance with sharply divergent debt trajectories: Nigeria, which has continued servicing its obligations without formal distress, and Zambia, which defaulted on its Eurobonds in 2020 and underwent a protracted, China-influenced restructuring. Drawing on a mixed-methods, comparative case-study design, this article triangulates data from the Chinese Loans to Africa Database, Nigeria's Debt Management Office, and independent debt-policy research organizations, analysed against four indicators: creditor diversification, loan structure and collateralisation, transparency and oversight, and domestic fiscal governance. The findings show no evidence of deliberate Chinese asset seizure in either case, undermining the strong coercive version of the debt-trap thesis. However, Zambia's 2023 restructuring which extended maturities to 2043 while leaving its debt-to-GDP ratio unchanged at 110.8 percent illustrates that the absence of coercion does not equate to the absence of dependency. The article argues that the Nigeria–Zambia divergence is best explained not by differences in Chinese lending intent, but by borrower-side variables: Nigeria's more diversified creditor base (approximately 9.5 percent Chinese exposure) against Zambia's far higher concentration (approximately 30 percent), compounded by weaker fiscal buffers and slower, fragmented creditor coordination in Zambia's case. These findings support an integrated theoretical framework combining dependency theory with borrower agency, and inform a set of policy recommendations centred on creditor diversification, contract-level transparency, and faster multilateral debt-resolution coordination.