Abstract Bail is among the most frequently exercised and least consistently disciplined discretions in Nigerian criminal procedure. Federal and State High Courts often grant bail in form while attaching conditions that many defendants cannot meet: Grade Level 16 or 17 civil servant sureties, title to land in named high-value districts, and cash deposits running into tens or hundreds of millions of naira. Using a doctrinal method, this article examines those terms against sections 35 and 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and sections 158, 161–162, 165, and 167 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. It draws on Supreme Court and Court of Appeal authorities, including Suleman v. Commissioner of Police (2008), Dokubo-Asari v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007), Dasuki v. Director-General, State Security (2019), Nolan v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2020), Adole v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2022), and Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Efenyumi (2026). The article distinguishes between the lawful objective of bail, that is, to secure the attendance of the accused, while the accused remains presumed innocent against pre-trial punishment. It finds that a condition which cannot reasonably be fulfilled is a constructive refusal of bail and makes liberty contingent on wealth or public office. Appellate courts have already supplied a workable standard: fix the quantum to the defendant’s circumstances; require a resident surety who knows the accused; treat public office as evidence of stability, not a closed class; and verify landed security at the local registry rather than in a luxury district. Applying that standard would reduce remand congestion and restore the presumption of innocence in High Court practice. Keywords: Bail; Administration of Criminal Justice Act; presumption of innocence; sureties; High Court; Nigeria