The law already recognises that a company, though abstract in nature, can do certain things which a natural person can do, such as owning properties, entering into contracts, communicating, being able to sue and be sued, and even to have an intention. As a creation of the law, a company has a distinct personality and life of its own, but it only lives and acts through natural persons who are its directors. The ascription of human capacities to a company is necessary for it to operate effectively. It enables a company to lay claim to and also be responsible for the actions and inactions of its human directors when the latter act within the context of their authority. However, in several cases, the courts have shown strong disinclination to recognise the possibility that sentience, although typically associated with natural persons, can also be attributed to a company in the same contexts in which the actions and inactions of its human directors are ascribed to it. This consequently creates a limitation for companies with respect to the reliefs they can claim or get from the courts, as seen in the recent case of F.C.M.B. v. Abdul Gafaru & Co. Ltd (2026) 6 NWLR (Pt. 2038) 179. However, with the aid of Lord Denning’s analogy of a company in Bolton (H L) (Engineering) Company Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd (1957) 1 QB 159 and insights from legal realism, this research challenges the traditional approach of the courts to the sentience of companies and calls for a jurisprudence more consciously attuned to social realities. It argues that, since the acts, knowledge and representations of a company’s human directors, when acting within the context of their authority, are legally deemed to be those of the company, the law can be developed to attribute the experiences (emotions) of these natural persons, in the same context, to the company.