Managerial remuneration occupies a central place in corporate governance debates because it sits at the intersection of agency theory, statutory regulation and firm strategy. This paper re-examines the trend and pattern of managerial remuneration among NIFTY 50 companies over the period March 2010 to April 2025, and evaluates how far remuneration structures are associated with firm-level characteristics such as size, profitability, leverage and ownership concentration. Building on the statutory framework laid down in Section 197 and Schedule V of the Companies Act, 2013 and the disclosure regime introduced through the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, the paper synthesises prior Indian and international evidence, develops a set of testable hypotheses, and lays out a panel-data methodology suited to a fifteen-year secondary-data study. The discussion situates the Indian findings against the broader pay-for-performance literature and highlights three recurring themes: a persistent but modest pay-performance sensitivity, the disproportionate influence of firm size and promoter control on remuneration outcomes, and the growing regulatory emphasis on disclosure (including the director-to-median-employee pay ratio) as a governance tool in place of blunt statutory ceilings. The paper concludes that remuneration in Indian firms functions less as a pure incentive-alignment mechanism and more as an outcome jointly shaped by ownership structure, board composition and evolving disclosure norms, and it outlines directions for future empirical work. Keywords: Managerial Remuneration, Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, NIFTY 50, Companies Act 2013, SEBI LODR